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FEDERAL INCOME TAX - CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS -
AN INDIVIDUAL'S ASSIGNMENT OF PREMIUM REFUNDS TO 
THE AMERICAN BAR ENDOWMENT IS DEDUCTIBLE WHEN 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ENDOWMENT AND THE 
TAXPAYER IS NOT PREDOMINATELY OF A BUSINESS NA-
TURE AND THE TRANSACTION HAS A SUBSTANTIAL CHAR-
ITABLE COMPONENT. American Bar Endowment v. United States, 
761 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 522 (1985). 
As part of a continuing fund raising plan, the American Bar Endow-
ment (ABE) offered group life insurance to its members with the require-
ment that participants assign to the ABE any premium refunds earned 
under the policies.! Participants reported charitable contributions on 
their income tax returns for the amount of premium refunds assigned. 2 
The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the participants' charitable de-
ductions, and the taxpayers filed a refund suit in the United States 
Claims Court. 3 The court held the participants' contributions were not 
tax deductible because the taxpayers failed to establish that they 
l. American Bar Endowment v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 404, 408 (1984), rev'd, 761 
F.2d 1573, cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 522 (1985). This article will address only the 
Government's appeal of the individual taxpayers claims that the assignment of pre-
mium refunds to the American Bar Endowment constituted a charitable deduction. 
For a discussion of the formation of the group insurance plan, see The Found-
ing and Purpose o/the American Bar Endowment, 48 A.B.A.J. 653 (1962). Partici-
pating insurance policies differ from nonparticipating insurance plans by 
periodically distributing a dividend to policyholders. The dividend is possible be-
cause the original premium charged is redundant, and there remains a surplus at the 
end of the year. This surplus is not a profit, as in the case of commercial and indus-
trial corporations, but an excess collected from the insured. R. RIEGEL & J. 
MILLER, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 275 (4th ed. 1959). 
2. American Bar Endowment, 4 Cl. Ct. at 408 (1984), rev'd, 761 F.2d 1573, cert. 
granted, 106 S. Ct. 522 (1985). See I.R.C. § 170 (1982), which provides; 
(a) Allowance of deductions. -
(l) General rule. -
There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution (as 
defined in subsection (c» payment of which is made within the taxa-
ble year .... 
(c) Charitable contribution defined. For purposes of this section, the term 
"charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use 
of-
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation -
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, sci-
entific, literary, or educational purposes .... 
The Internal Revenue Service regulations concerning section 170 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1954 do not define the word "charitable" nor the phrase "con-
tribution or gift." See Treas. Reg. § 1.170 (1954). 
3. See American Bar Endowment, 4 Cl. Ct. at 414-15 (1984), rev'd, 761 F.2d 1573, cert. 
granted, 106 S. Ct. 522 (1985). In 1982, the United States Claims Court was estab-
lished as a trial level court, replacing United States Court of Claims trial magis-
trates. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. 
The Claims Court accepted as binding precedent all published decisions of the 
United States Court of Claims, unless and until modified by decisions of the United 
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purchased the insurance policies for more than their economic values 
with the intention that the excess be used to benefit the charitable enter-
prise.4 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
CircuitS reversed.6 The court remanded the case holding that the proper 
inquiry to determine the deductibility of the assigned premium refunds is 
whether the relationship between the ABE and the taxpayers was pre-
dominately of a business nature or whether the transaction had a sub-
stantial charitable component as determined by the circumstances 
surrounding the transaction.7 
The concept of a federal income tax deduction for charitable contri-
butions originated in the Tariff Act of 1913,8 which provided for a pro-
gressive individual income tax.9 During the House of Representatives 
debate concerning the Act's definition of net income, an amendment was 
proffered to include a deduction for gifts made by individuals to charita-
ble, educational, religious, and benevolent societies. 10 The purpose of the 
proposed deduction was to encourage charitable contributions by exclud-
ing the income used to make those contributions from federal taxation. I I 
The House of Representatives, however, rejected the amendment,12 and 
enacted the Tariff Act of 1913 without a charitable contribution 
provision. 13 
Four years later, Congress changed its position when it passed the 
War Revenue Act. 14 This Act contained a provision permitting deduc-
tions from net income for contributions or gifts made by individuals to 
charitable, educational, religious, and scientific organizations, and to 
children or animal cruelty prevention societies. IS With the onset of the 
First World War and the consequent levy of higher taxes, Congress 
feared individuals would reduce their donations to eleemosynary institu-
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or the United States Supreme Court. 
United States Claims Court General Order No. l(c) (Oct. 7, 1982). 
4. American Bar Endowment, 4 Cl. Ct. at 417-18 (1984), rev'd, 761 F.2d 1573, cert. 
granted, 106 S. Ct. 522 (1985). This standard indicates a predominant motivational 
requirement of disinterested generosity, to be proved by the taxpayer. American Bar 
Endowment, 761 F.2d 1573, 1581 n.8, cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 522 (1985). 
5. In 1982, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created, 
and the United States Court of Claims was abolished. Federal Courts Improvement 
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. The Federal Circuit expressly adopted 
prior decisions of the Court of Claims as binding precedent. South Corp. v. United 
States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 (1982) (en banc). 
6. American Bar Endowment, 761 F.2d at 1583, cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 522 (1985). 
7. American Bar Endowment, 761 F.2d at 1582-83, cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 522 (1985). 
8. Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114. 
9. 50 CONGo REC. 1259 (1913). 
10. 50 CONGo REC. 1259 (1913); J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1938-1861, at 945 (1938). 
11. 50 CONGo REC. 1259 (1913); J. SEIDMAN, supra note 10, at 945. 
12. 50 CONGo REC. 1259 (1913); J. SEIDMAN, supra note 10, at 945. 
13. 50 CONGo REC. 1259 (1913). 
14. War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 1201(2),40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917). 
15. 55 CONGo REC. 6728-29 (1917); J. SEIDMAN, supra note 10, at 944. 
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tions. 16 It was thought that a substantial reduction in donations would 
weaken charitable institutions and result in the federal government subsi-
dizing these institutions in a less efficient manner than by individuals' 
direct donations. 17 As a result of this trepidation, Congress enacted the 
charitable contribution provision to ensure the continued existence of 
charitable institutions. IS 
Congress placed specific limitations on income tax deductions for 
charitable contributions, however, to prevent individuals from deducting 
substantial amounts of their income and thereby harming the public 
treasury. 19 Deductions for charitable contributions were limited to fifteen 
percent of an individual's net income.2o Also, donations were deductible 
only when given to Congressionally approved donees.21 
For the next eight years, the provision for charitable deductions re-
mained substantially unchanged.22 The Revenue Act of 192123 enlarged 
the class of eligible donees by including not only literary societies,24 but 
also American Legion posts and auxiliary units and the United States, its 
territories, or political subdivisions.25 The Revenue Act of 192426 broad-
ened the class of eligible donees to embrace all war veteran organizations 
and auxiliary units and fraternal entities organized and operated for reli-
gious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes.27 
During the 1930's and 1940's, several significant changes were made 
to the charitable contribution provision. In 1934, political activism 
prompted Congress to remove lobbying organizations from the class of 
16. 55 CONGo REC. 6728-29 (1917). 
17. Id.; see Quiggle & Myers, Tax Aspects of Charitable Contributions and Bequests by 
Individuals, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 579, 579-80 (1959). 
18.Id. 
19. 55 CONGo REC. 6728 (1917). 
20. Id. at 6729. 
21. Id. at 6728. Those Congressionally specified donees included corporations or as-
sociations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or 
educational purposes, or to societies for the prevention of cruelty to children or 
animals. Id. Those organizations are representative of the organizations accorded 
tax exempt status under the Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § II(a)(6), 39 Stat. 756, 
766. The proferred amendment purposefully encompassed substantially the same 
language because the thrust of the amendment was to protect the eleemosynary 
institution by allowing no taxation of the funds expended for charitable purposes. 
See id.; cf 50 CONGo REC. 1259 (1913) (the Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 
proposed to include essentially the same organizations entitled to tax exempt 
status). 
22. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 2214(a)(1l), 40 Stat. 1057, 1068 (1919); Reve-
nue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 214(a)(1l), 42 Stat. 227, 241; Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 
234, § 2214(a)(1O), 43 Stat. 253, 271; Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 214(a)(10),44 
Stat. 9, 2728. 
23. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227. 
24. Id. § 214(a)(11), 42 Stat. at 241. The tax exemption provision also includes literary 
societies. Id. § 231(6), 42 Stat. at 253. 
25. Id. § 214(a)(1l), 43 Stat. at 241; see J. SEIDMAN, supra note 10, at 838. 
26. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253. 
27. Id. § 214(a)(1O), 43 Stat. at 271; see J. SEIDMAN, supra note 10, at 733. 
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eligible donees. 28 In 1935, to stimulate donations, the chartiable contri-
bution provision was made applicable to corporations.29 In 1946, as a 
result of the Second World War, Congress enlarged the charitable contri-
bution provision to encompass donations to the United Nations made 
within one year of the date of the enactment and used exclusively for the 
acquisition of a headquarter's site in New York City.3D 
In 1962, the federal jUdiciary retreated from the liberalization of the 
charitable deduction provision. In DeJong v. Commissioner,31 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the Commissioner 
v. Duberstein 32 test defining a gift under IRC § 102(a)33 to determine the 
meaning of the phrase "contribution or gift" under IRC § 170 as applied 
to donations by individuals.34 In Duberstein, the Supreme Court held 
that a donor's sUbjective intent is the ultimate criterion of a gift under 
IRC § 102(a).35 Under Duberstein a gift must proceed from "detached or 
disinterested generosity"36 or "out of affection, respect, admiration, char-
ity, or like impulses."37 DeJong held that a deductible charitable contri-
bution must proceed from like intentions.38 
Since DeJong, various tests have been applied to determine whether 
a donation is a charitable contribution under IRC § 170. In addition to 
the Duberstein standard, courts have continued to apply the common law 
28. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 23(0)(2), 48 Stat. 680, 690; see J. SEIDMAN, supra 
note 10, at 312. This change comports with the removal of these same organizations 
from the tax exemption provisions. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 101(6),48 Stat. 
680,700. 
29. Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 102(c), 49 Stat. 1014, 1016. 
30. Pub. L. No.7, § § 1 & 2, 61 Stat. 6 (1977). 
31. 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962). 
32. 363 U.S. 278 (1960). 
33. 1.R.e. § 102(a) (1958) stated: "Gross income does not include the value of property 
acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance." The language of I.R.C. § 102(a) 
remains the same today. See infra note 75. 
34. DeJong, 309 F.2d at 377-79. The United States Tax Court also adheres to the Du-
berstein standard for individuals. See, e.g., Fausner v. Commissioner, 55 T.e. 620, 
624 (1971) ("the payments must have been made as acts of detached or disinterested 
generosity and not for the anticipated benefit of the payor"); Wolfe v. Commis-
sioner, 54 T.e. 1707, 1713-14 (1970) (Duberstein principles are equally applicable 
with regard to the term "gift" as used in I.R.e. § 170); Howard v. Commissioner, 
39 T.e. 833, 838 (1963) ("three payments in question were not charitable gifts, pro-
ceeding from a 'detached and disinterested generosity' or 'out of affection, respect, 
admiration, charity or like impulses' but instead proceeded from 'the incentive of 
anticipated benefit' "). But see Graham v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 575, 581 (1984) 
(court relied upon the presence of a quid pro quo to deny the taxpayer a charitable 
deduction) (this decision has not been followed). During the 1970's, the Duberstein 
rationale was adopted by the Tenth and Second Circuits to determine the de-
ductibility of both an individual's and a corporation's charitable contributions. See 
Dowell v. United States, 553 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1977); Winters v. Commissioner, 
468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972). 
35. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285-86. 
36. Id. at 285 (quoting Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)). 
37. Id. at 285 (quoting Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952)). 
38. DeJong, 309 F.2d at 379. 
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definition of a gift, which preceded DeJong,39 have used a "dominant 
motive" test,40 and have applied a quid pro quo test.41 Moreover, some 
jurisdictions further distinguish between individual and corporate dona-
tions to determine which test applies.42 
Several jurisdictions continue to rely on the common law definition 
of a gift to decide whether a donation is deductible.43 A charitable dona-
tion that satisfies the common law elements of a gift is deductible pursu-
ant to IRe § 170.44 A common law gift requires a competent donor,45 an 
eligible donee,46 an irrevocable transfer,47 a lack of consideration,48 and 
an intent to divest oneself of all title, dominion, and control over the 
subject matter of the gift.49 
In 1968, the Ninth Circuit refused to apply the Duberstein test to a 
corporation's charitable contributions and applied the dominant motive 
test instead. 50 The court provided two fundamental reasons for the dis-
similar treatment it now gave corporations and individuals. First, the 
39. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text. 
40. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. 
41. See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text. 
42. See supra note 34 and infra notes 53 & 62 and accompanying text. 
43. See Mason v. United States, 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975); Sedam v. United States, 
518 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975) (court expressly refused to consider the applicability of 
Duberstein to I.R.C. § 170 charitable contributions); Orr v. United States, 343 F.2d 
553 (5th Cir. 1965); Estate of Wardwell v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 
1962); Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 900 (W.D.S.C. 1965). 
44. See Nehring v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1942). 
45. E.g., Nehring v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1943); Edson v. Lucas, 
40 F.2d 398, 404 (8th Cir. 1930); Apt v. Birminghan, 89 F. Supp. 361, 370 (N.D. 
Iowa 1950). 
46. 1.R.e. § 170(c) (1982). Section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code restricts those 
donees qualifying as recipients of tax deductible donations to those specifically enu-
merated. Id. The list of donees acceptable under the Code reflects the basic policy 
that only those public charitable contributions made to benefit an indefinite number 
of recipients qualify for deductions. Chester D. Tripp, T.e.M. (P-H) 63, 244 (1963), 
aff'd sub nom. Tripp v. Commissioner, 337 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1964); Thomason v. 
Commissioner, 2 T.e. 441 (1943). The criterion of indefiniteness, however, tradi-
tionally has not been strictly observed. Deductibility has been allowed when the 
donor has made a preference to possible recipients, provided the contribution was 
not limited to those preferred. Havemeyer v. Commissioner, 98 F.2d 706, 707 (2d 
Cir. 1938); see also Canal Nat'l Bank v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 626, 630 (D. 
Me. 1966) ("a charitable deduction will not be defeated because a preference is to be 
given in the selection of the beneficiaries to relatives of the testator who otherwise 
qualify as objects of legitimate charitable purposes"). 
47. E.g., Orr v. United States, 343 F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1965); Nehring v. Commis-
sioner, 131 F.2d 790, 793-94 (7th Cir. 1942); Sullivan v. Commissioner, 16 T.e. 228, 
231 (1951). 
48. E.g., Mason v. United States, 513 F.2d 25, 29 (7th Cir. 1975); Sedam v. United 
States, 518 F.2d 242, 245 (7th Cir. 1975); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. United States, 
200 F. Supp. 91, 94 (E.D. Wis. 1961). 
49. E.g., Orr v. United States, 343 F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1965); Nehring v. Commis-
sioner, 131 F.2d 790, 793-94 (7th Cir. 1943); Maysteel Prods., Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 33 T.e. 1021, 1024-25 (1960), rev'd 011 other grounds, 287 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 
1961). 
50. United States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968). 
1986] American Bar Endowment v. United States 609 
court stated that it is inappropriate to require a corporate entity to act 
with human feelings, such as affection, respect, or admiration. 51 Second, 
the court reasoned that the requirement of detached and disinterested 
generosity, or lack of any business purpose, could render substantially all 
corporate charitable contributions ultra vires, and thus frustrate Con-
gress's desire to permit corporate deductions for charitable donations. 52 
The Ninth Circuit's application of the "dominant motive" test to 
determine the deductibility of a corporation's charitable transaction is 
objective in nature. 53 A donation to a statutorily enumerated eleemosy-
nary institution that proceeds primarily from charitable motives is de-
ductible as a charitable contribution. 54 Strongly probative of the 
taxpayer's dominant motive for a transaction is whether the donor re-
ceives an indirect, incidental business benefit or a direct economic benefit 
from the transaction. 55 The presence of an indirect, incidental benefit will 
not cast doubt upon a transaction's deductibility as a charitable dona-
tion.56 The receipt of a direct economic benefit, however, indicates the 
absence of a dominant charitable purpose and, hence, where there is di-
rect economic benefit a corporate transaction is nondeductible as a chari-
table contribution. 57 
Three years later, the United States Court of Claims, in Singer Co. v. 
United States,58 also rejected the Duberstein standard to determine the 
deductibility of a corporation's charitable contribution. The court's rea-
51. [d. at 524. 
52. [d.; see also Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 900, 904 
(W.D.S.C. 1965) (a corporation may have a business purpose or derive some benefit 
from a charitable contribution); Garrett, Corporate Donations, 22 Bus. LAW. 297 
(1967) (donations should bear some reasonable relation to the corporation's 
interest). 
53. See United States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1976). For a period 
of time, the Ninth Circuit applied this test to individual's transactions. See, e.g., 
Allen v. United States, 541 F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 1976) (court reiterates that the 
dominant purpose of a transaction is the controlling factor); Collman v. Commis-
sioner, 511 F.2d 1263, 1267 (9th Cir. 1976) (a payment that proceeds primarily 
from the incentive of anticipated benefit is not a gift); Stubb v. United States, 428 
F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971) ("extent to which public 
spirited and charitable benevolence prompted their action" is probed "to expose the 
true nature of the transaction"). Support for a dominant motive standard can be 
found in the language of DeJong. DeJong, 309 F.2d at 379. This test has been ap-
plied by the First Circuit to decide the deductibility issue for all donations. See 
Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1001 (1st Cir. 1972). 
54. See Allen v. United States, 541 F.2d 786, 788 (9th CiT. 1976). 
55. See Allen v. United States, 541 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1976); Stubbs v. United States, 
428 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971); United States v. 
Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968). Legislative history of I.R.C. 
§ 162(b) infers that a factor to be considered when determining the applicability of 
1.R.c. § 170 is the presence of an economic benefit. See infra note 99 and accompa-
nying text. 
56. See Col/man, 511 F.2d at 1269. 
57. See Stubbs, 428 F.2d at 887. 
58. 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. CI. 1971). 
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sons for repudiating Duberstein were not clearly delineated. 59 Further-
more, the Court of Claims rejected the "dominant motive" test60 and 
held that distinguishing between direct and indirect benefits was too re-
strictive a test to determine the deductibility of a corporation's charitable 
transaction.61 Thus, the Court of Claims formulated a quid pro quo test 
for ascertaining the deductibility of a corporation's charitable contribu-
tion.62 It held that a quid pro quo sufficient to deny a charitable contribu-
tion is present when the benefits received, or expected to be received, by 
the donor are "substantial" although the benefits received may be 
indirect.63 
In a case of first impression, the Federal Circuit in American Bar 
Endowment v. United States 64 determined that an individual's assign-
ment of insurance premium refunds to a charitable organization holding 
the group policy is deductible under IRC § 170 if the relationship be-
tween the organization and the taxpayer is not predominately of a busi-
ness nature and the transaction has a substantial charitable component.65 
Comparing the Claims Court's analysis to a predominant motivational 
requirement of "disinterested generosity,"66 the Federal Circuit deter-
59. Id. at 422. 
60. See id. at 422-23. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 413. This approach has been followed by at least one federal district court to 
resolve the deductibility of all charitable donations, and the United States Tax 
Court to determine the deductibility of a corporation's charitable donation. See 
Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Louisville & Nash-
ville R.R. Co. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 962 (1976), rev'd in part on other grounds, 
641 F.2d 435 (1981) (the court accepted the Singer quid pro quo test and relied upon 
DeJong for the narrow proposition that a gift is a voluntary transfer of property 
without consideration). 
63. Singer, 449 F.2d at 413; Ottawa Silica Co. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1124, 1131-32 
(Fed. Cir. 1983). 
The plain language [of the Singer test] clearly indicates that a 'substantial 
benefit' received in return for a contribution consitutes a quid pro quo, 
which precludes a deduction. The court defined a substantial benefit as one 
that is 'greater than those that inure to the general public from transfers 
for charitable purposes.' Those benefits that inure to the general public 
from charitable contributions are incidental to the contribution, and the 
donor, as a member of the general public, may receive them. It is only 
when the donor receives or expects to receive additional substantial bene-
fits that courts are likely to conclude that a quid pro quo for the transfer 
exists and that the donor is therefore not entitled to a charitable 
deduction. 
669 F.2d at 1132 (citations omitted). 
64. 761 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 522 (1985); see also Gregory & 
Carpenter, Fed. Circuit Holds ABE Insurance Program Does Not Constitute Unre-
lated Business Income, J. TAX'N, Oct. 1985, at 244 (synopsis of court decision). 
65. 761 F.2d at 1582. See also Gregory & Carpenter, supra note 64, at 248 ("the ques-
tion to be posed is whether the transaction between the Endowment and the taxpay-
ers . . . 'was of a business nature and not charitable,' the answer to which 'must 
flow from an examination of all the pertinent circumstances surrounding the indi-
vidual transaction-there is no single-factor test' "). 
66. See supra note 4. 
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mined that the analysis exacted too harsh a burden on taxpayers because 
it required proof of more than a charitable motive.67 The court also 
found that the Claims Court analysis could support the opposite conclu-
sion from the one it drew.68 The appellate court further reasoned that the 
Claims Court analysis erroneously assumed that all individuals act solely 
for economic reasons, rather than recognizing that individuals act out of 
various indistinguishable intentions. 69 
The Federal Circuit's adoption of the Singer quid pro quo standard 
to determine the deductibility of a charitable donation avoids the dubious 
approach of the Ninth Circuit and the Tax Court which apply one stan-
dard of review to individuals and another to corporations.70 This artifi-
cial distinction between individuals and corporations is untenable in view 
of the legislative history of the enactment.71 Nowhere in the legislative 
history is there any indication that Congress intended or envisioned the 
application of a stringent standard to individuals and a less stringent 
standard to corporations. Rather, the intendment of IRC § 170 was to 
guarantee the economic vitality of the charitable institution that would 
receive the contribution.72 Consonant with such intendment is a single 
standard that determines the deductibility of all charitable contributions. 
Furthermore, Congress must have envisioned the application of a single 
standard when it enacted the same statutory language to govern the de-
ductibility of an individual's and a corporation's contributions.73 
The Duberstein test constricts the deductibility of IRC § 170 chari-
table contributions by mandating an exacting standard to determine the 
nature of a gift.74 The Duberstein interpretation of a gift was the result of 
a strict construction of IRC § 102(a).75 This interpretation is diametri-
cally opposite to the liberal construction which should be accorded to 
67. 761 F.2d at 1581. See also Gregory & Carpenter, supra note 64, at 248 (Claims 
Court standard "required proof of 'more than a charitable transaction' "). 
68. 761 F.2d at 1581-82. See also Gregory & Carpenter, supra note 64, at 248 ("Claims 
Court's comparisons of insurance prices 'can support the opposite conclusion from 
the one it draws' "). 
69. 761 F.2d at 1582. See also Gregory & Carpenter, supra note 64, at 248 (Claims 
Court standard incorrectly "assumed that all participants were purely economic 
persons, acting solely on a careful and detailed comparative investigation of pecuni-
ary results and expectations"). 
70. See supra notes 34, 53, 62 and accompanying text. 
71. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
72. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. 
73. I.R.C. § 170(a) (1982). When Congress sought to apply different percentage limita-
tions, the statute expressly provided for different limitations. Compare IRC 
§ 170(b)(1) (1982) (individual's percentage limitations), with IRC § 170(b)(2) (1982) 
(corporation's percentage limitations). Also, when Congress sought to apply differ-
ent carryovers of excess contributions, the statute expressly provided for different 
carryovers. Compare I.R.C. § 170(d)(1) (1982) (individual's carryovers of excess 
contributions), with I.R.C. § 170(d)(2) (1982) (corporation's carryovers of excess 
contributions). 
74. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
75. I.R.C. § 102(a) (1982) states: "Gross income does not include the value of property 
acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance." 
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IRC § 170,16 Section 102(a) was not enacted to encourage gifts. Congress 
intended the section to serve as a narrow exception from the broad re-
quirement of including within gross income, revenue produced by one's 
labor or through the use of one's capital,77 On the other hand, IRC § 170 
was enacted to encourage charitable donations to established charitable 
institutions.78 Consistent with the precepts of section 170, Congress has 
periodically amended the enactment to stimulate charitable contribu-
tions.79 Hence, judicial fiat that creates an additional limitation by plac-
ing an overwhelming burden on the taxpayer to prove detached and 
disinterested generosity is unsupportable. 
Moreover, "disinterested generosity" is a nebulous and illusive stan-
dard. 80 It requires an imprecise probing of sUbjective judgment as to 
what prompts the financial support of charitable organizations.8) Subjec-
tive determinations would inevitably result in IRC § 170 becoming a 
"mare's nest of uncertainty woven of judicial value judgments irrelevant 
to eleemosynary reality. "82 Confusion and heightened difficulty in satis-
fying the requirements of IRC § 170 would result in fewer charitable do-
nations, which is contrary to the policy of the enactment. 83 
Reliance on the common law definition of a gift to determine the 
deductibility of a charitable contribution is equally misplaced. The Act 
expressly defines a charitable contribution as a "contribution or 
gift .... "84 To rely solely on a gift's common law definition would ig-
nore the "contribution" language. If Congress had intended to condition 
deductibility on satisfaction of the requirements of a common law gift, 
there would have been no need to add the word contribution. 8s 
76. See Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1934) in which the Supreme Court 
succinctly stated, "[t]he exemption of income devoted to charity and the reduction 
of the rate of tax on capital gains were liberalizations of the law in the taxpayer's 
favor, were begotten from motives of public policy, and are not to be narrowly 
construed." 
77. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189,207 (1920) (dictum) (this definition of income is 
no longer followed); W. Klein, An Enigma in the Federal Income Tax: The Meaning 
of the Word "Gift", 48 MINN. L. REV. 215, 246-259 (1963). 
78. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. 
79. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text. 
80. Note, Disinterested Generosity: An Emerging Criteria of Deductibility Under Section 
170, UTAH L. REV. 475 (1968); W. Klein, An Enigma in the Federal Income Tax: 
The Meaning of the Word "Gift," 48 MINN. L. REV. 215, 219-220 (1963). 
81. Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971); see Crosby Valve & Gage 
Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967); 
Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972); Haak v. United States, 
451 F. Supp. 1087, 1091-92 (W.D. Mich. 1978). 
82. Crosby Valve & Gage Co., 380 F.2d at 146; see also Klein, supra note 88, at 220 
(judicial definition and application of such a vague test can result in the implicit 
adoption of standards that substantially alter the basic concept); cf Perm utter v. 
Commissioner, 45 T.C. 311, 317 (1965) (subjective and ephemeral concepts underly-
ing gift tax cases are not necessarily applicable to charitable contribution cases). 
83. Crosby Valve & Gage Co., 380 F.2d at 146, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 979 (1967). 
84. 1.R.c. § 170(c) (1982). 
85. Compare Amend. to H.R. 3321, 63d Cong., 1st Sess., 50 CONGo REC. 1259 (1939) 
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The "dominant motive" test overcomes the difficult subjective deter-
minations that are mandated by the Duberstein test and the overly re-
strictive common law definition of a gift. The test, however, is not 
without significant limitations. Although the statute requires a charitable 
contribution, the "dominant motive" standard conflicts with the Act's 
express definition ofthe phrase "charitable contribution." Section 170(c) 
defines a charitable contribution as a "contribution or gift to or for the 
use of' Congressionally approved donees. 86 Each of these Congression-
ally specified donees are eleemosynary institutions.87 The "charitable" 
portion of the phrase is broadly defined by the "to or for the use of" 
language. 88 The word "contribution" is defined as a "contribution or 
gift."89 Engrafting a charitable requirement on the "contribution" por-
tion of the phrase would require a further determination of charitable 
motives. If this were Congress's intent, Congress would have defined a 
"charitable contribution" as a charitable contribution or gift to or for the 
use of Congressionally specified donees. 
The "dominant motive" standard does not comport with the Con-
gressional intent underlying the charitable contribution provision.90 The 
standard too narrowly interprets the deductibility issue. The "dominant 
motive" test denies a charitable deduction to any taxpayer whose domi-
nant motive when making a donation was not charitable.91 A taxpayer 
who gives property to a charitable institution and receives nothing in 
exchange is denied a deduction unless the motive is predominantly chari-
table, whereas a taxpayer who gives property to a charitable organization 
with a dominant charitable motive and the expectation to receive indi-
rect, incidental benefits is entitled to a deduction. This is repugnant to 
the Congressional desire to encourage donations to charitable enter-
prises, and to enable them to remain self-supporting on private 
donations.92 
The "dominant motive" inquiry does recognize that a charitable 
contribution may proceed, in part, from noncharitable motivations.93 
Prestige, conscience-salving, and a vindictive desire to prevent relatives 
(included gifts, but did not include contributions), with War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 
1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917) (included gifts and contributions). 
86. I.R.C. § 170(c) (1982). 
87. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(1)-(4) (1982). 
88. I.R.C. § 170(c) (1982). 
89.Id. 
90. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. 
91. See Stubbs, 428 F.2d at 887. 
92. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. 
93. See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 541 F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 1976) (element of quid 
pro quo in the city's approval of a desired cluster-zoning plan upon the dedication of 
the nine acres of redwoods, but donative intent was dominant); Collman v. Commis-
sioner, 511 F.2d 1263, 1269 n.3 (elements of self-interest in the conveyance ofland 
to the county for the widening of a road, but donative intent was dominant); Stubbs 
v. United States, 428 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 
(1971) (extent to which charitable motives prompted their action resolves deduct-
ibility issue). 
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from inheriting family wealth are some of the motives that may lie close 
to the heart of one who gives to charity.94 These various motives are 
often inextricably entangled with a charitable motive. The "dominant 
motive" test requires an objective evaluation of the taxpayer's dominant 
motive, which is sUbjective in nature. This calls for a segregation and 
ranking of these entangled motives to determine which is predominant. 
The segregation of motives is immensely difficult to accomplish when the 
motives are numerous, and is impossible when the motives are inextric-
ably intertwined. Assuming the taxpayer's motives are separable, courts 
still are faced with the formidable task of ranking these desires according 
to their effect on the taxpayer. Thus, the test, with its inherent difficulties 
in administration, would result in uncertain tax treatment. The possibil-
ity of federal taxation of the income used to make the donations might 
result in individuals reducing their charitable contributions to eleemosy-
nary institutions. This again is the very result that Congress sought to 
avoid. 
Unlike the other tests, a quid pro quo test comports with the lan-
guage of the statute and the Congressional desire to encourage donations 
to charitable enterprises. A quid pro quo test also, by objectively deter-
mining the deductibility of a charitable transaction, avoids the adminis-
trative difficulties associated with the Duberstein test and the "dominant 
motive" test. A quid pro quo test acknowledges the multitude of motives 
entangled with a charitable motive.95 The test implicitly determines the 
charitable nature of the transaction by requiring the contribution or gift 
to be made to Congressionally specified charitable organizations.96 The 
presence of a deductible contribution or gift is objectively decided by 
broadly considering all relevant factors to determine if the donor re-
ceived or expected to receive no additional substantial benefits greater 
than those that inure to the general public.97 The provisions of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code permitting charitable deductions do not prohibit a tax-
payer from deriving some benefit, direct or indirect, from charitable 
contributions.98 This is consonant with Congress's interpretation of a 
contribution as one that is "made with no expectation of a financial re-
turn commensurate with the amount of the gift."99 
94. Crosby Valve & Gage Co., 380 F.2d at 146. 
95. Singer, 449 F.2d at 423. 
96. See id. at 424. 
97. Id. at 423. 
98. Cj. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 243 F. Supp. 900, 904 (w.n.s.c. 1965) (I.R.C. § 170 
does not prohibit a corporation from deriving some benefit from charitable 
contributions). 
99. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 196, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 4621,4830-31; H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A44, reprinted 
in 1954 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4017,4180. The committee reports are in 
reference to I.R.C. § 162(b) (1954) which stated: "no deduction shall be allowed 
... for any contribution or gift which would be allowable as a deduction under 
section 170 were it not solely for the percentage limitations, the dollar limitations, 
or the requirements as to the time of payment, set forth in such section." 
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The Federal Circuit in American Bar Endowment, however, miscon-
strues the Singer quid pro quo test. The Federal Circuit states, "the multi-
faceted inquiry mandated by Singer - Ottawa Silica . . . looks at the en-
tire transaction, including of course the factor of relative values, but also 
that of overall purpose, donative intent, etc."IOO Singer defines a contribu-
tion as a transfer in which the donor receives or expects to receive no 
additional substantial benefits greater than those that inure to the general 
public. 1ol This requires consideration of a broad spectrum of factors to 
determine the benefits, tangible and intangible, inuring to the donor as a 
result of a contribution. The donor's intent, however, is not a relevant 
factor. \02 The state of mind with which the act was done does not bear 
upon whether the donor receives benefits greater than those that inure to 
the general public. \03 Rather, the donor's intent is relevant to resolving 
whether the contribution is charitable in nature. The statute mandates, as 
implicitly acknowledged by the Singer court, a one factor inquiry to the 
resolution of this issue: a charitable intent is objectively determined by 
whether the donation is made to or for the use of a statutorily enumer-
ated charitable enterprise. 
The American Bar Endowment quid pro quo approach is flawed as 
applied to individuals. The Federal Circuit erroneously states, "the gen-
eral question to be posed according to Singer and Ottawa Silica is 
whether the transaction . . . was of a business nature and not charita-
ble." 104 Inasmuch as those decisions involved the issue of whether a cor-
poration was entitled to a charitable deduction, the business nature of the 
transaction was an integral factor in the quid pro quo inquiry. But by 
focusing the inquiry on the business nature of the transaction rather than 
on the charitable nature of the transaction, the standard ignores the stat-
ute's plain language which requires a charitable contribution 105 and other 
Internal Revenue Code sections, such as the personal expense provi-
sion, \06 which may be equally or more relevant to individuals. This nar-
rowing of the quid pro quo test obfuscates those individual's actions that 
may be affected by reasons other than business or charitable desires. \07 
100. American Bar Endowment, 761 F.2d 1573, 1582 n.9 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. 
Ct. 522 (1985) (emphasis added). 
101. Singer, 449 F.2d at 423. 
102. See id. at 423. 
103. See id. 
104. /d. at 1582. 
105. See supra note 2. 
106. I.R.C. § 262 (1982) states: "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, 
no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses." 
107. See, e.g., Babilonia v. Commissioner, 681 F.2d 678, 679 (1982) (expenses incurred 
while accompanying an Olympic figure skater to various international competitions 
are not deductible as expenses incurred incident to performing a service to a charita-
ble organization); Graham v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 575, 580-81 (1984) (payments 
to a religious organization for spiritual services are nondeductible personal expendi-
tures and not charitable contributions); Fausner v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 620, 623-
25 (1971) (payments to three parochial schools for tuition and books are personal 
expenses and not deductible as charitable contributions). 
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For example, a taxpayer may donate to charity to create community 
goodwill or conversely to avoid community bad will. Thus, the American 
Bar Endowment quid pro quo test will result in IRC § 170 evolving into a 
trap for the ill-advised individual taxpayer who stresses the charitable 
motivations underlying his transaction, but neglects to equally stress the 
lack of business motivations. 
The Federal Circuit's application of a quid pro quo inquiry to deter-
mine the character of an individual's charitable contribution does over-
come the dubious and problematic approaches taken by other 
jurisdictions. However, the Federal Circuit's interjection of subjective 
factors and reliance on the business nature of the transaction is problem-
atic. Until the situation is rectified, taxpayers are presented with a stan-
dard that does not comport with the statute's plain language, Congress's 
intent, and human nature. Consequently, section 170 will remain a haz-
ard for the unwary individual taxpayer. 
James M di Stefano 
